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PUBLIC ACCESS TO PRIVATE LAND IN SCOTLAND 
D L Carey Miller 
 
1 Introduction 
 
This paper is concerned with a radical reform of Scottish land law introduced as part 
of the initial agenda of the Scottish Parliament reconvened in Edinburgh in 1999 after 
some 300 years. The reform concerned provides for rights of public access to private 
land.1 Access to land is of fundamental significance concerning issues of land 
governance, the theme of a conference2 at which a first version of the paper was 
given. The tension between private rights and the interests of the public may be seen 
to have a particular focus in the issue of public access to private land. The primary 
aim of this account will be to identify the scope of the new Scottish right in an attempt 
to determine the true nature of the change and, in particular, its significance as a 
limitation of the right of property. 
 
The essential focus of the paper is on the "access rights" provided for in part 1 of the 
Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, which came into force on 9 February 2005.3 The 
paper will cover the subject under the following headings: the pre-reform position; 
the essential features of the reform; excluded land; the Scottish Outdoor Access 
Code; the European Convention on Human Rights; the English law approach; and 
concluding observations. 
 
My Aberdeen colleague, Professor Roddy Paisley, commissioned by the Scottish 
Rights of Way and Access Society (Scotways), has written a revised edition of 
Professor A E Anton's guide to Scottish access rights and rights of way to take 
                                                 
 David L Carey Miller. Emeritus Professor of Property Law, University of Aberdeen, Senior 
Associate Research Fellow, Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, London, Advocate of the High 
Court of South Africa. My Aberdeen colleague Malcolm Combe most kindly read and commented 
in a full and valuable way on a draft, but the errors and failings in this final version are mine 
alone. 
1  The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, Part 1, brought into force on 9 February 2005 (SSI 2005 
No 17). 
2  "Good Governance in Land Tenure" supported by the Konrad Adeneauer Stuftung; organised by 
Professor Gerrit Pienaar and held at the Potchefstroom Campus of the University of North-West, 
South Africa, 22/23 April 2010. 
3  For an important general comment on the reforms in context, see Sellar 2006 Norwegian Journal 
of Geography. 
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account of the 2003 access reforms.4 This work is invaluable in putting the far-
reaching statutory access reforms into the context of the relevant common law.5 
 
Since I wrote the conference version of this paper, Professor John A Lovett of 
Loyola, New Orleans, USA has published a very full and most valuable study of 
Scottish access following a research visit to Edinburgh University as a Neil 
MacCormack Visiting Scholar in 2009.6 That study is referred to a number of times in 
this revised version of my paper.  
 
2 The pre-reform position 
 
There is no delict of trespass in the Romanist common law of Scotland; the 
landowner has an enforceable right to require a trespasser to leave but there is no 
civil claim for the act of trespass per se as there is, on the basis of the "tort of 
trespass", in English law.7 T B Smith (later Professor Sir Thomas), considering the 
scope of land ownership in his noted textbook,8 quoted the first Lord President 
Clyde's dictum9 that the word "trespasser" in Scotland is a popular rather than a legal 
term. The point here is that the civilian-based law of delict of Scots law does not 
recognise a right to damages arising from the act of trespass itself; trespass to land 
is only potentially relevant as a basis for liability where it has resulted in damage,10 
this being remedied by an action directed to reparation for patrimonial loss derived 
from the Roman Lex Aquilia.11 The point, noted by Professor Kenneth Norrie in a 
recent authoritative work, is that it is "not damages for the trespass, but damages for 
the hurt to the property".12  
 
                                                 
4  See Paisley Access Rights. 
5  Another valuable study is that of Tom Guthrie of the Law School of the University of Glasgow; 
see Guthrie "Access Rights" 125. 
6  Lovett 2010 Neb L Rev. 
7  See below n 19. 
8  Smith Short Commentary 526. 
9  Dumbreck v Addie 1928 SC 547, 554 
10  See Reid Law of Property para 185. See also Lovett 2010 Neb L Rev 762: "trespass in Scotland 
is primarily viewed as constituting a tort…assuming there is damage". 
11  Smith British Justice 158. 
12  Norrie "Intentional Delicts" 508. 
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As stated, however, a landowner can exclude one who has no right to be present on 
land and the remedy of interdict is potentially applicable to repeated incursions.13 
Even the right to apply self-help to the removal of an unwanted "trespasser" is, 
according to certain authorities, a circumscribed one.14 Relevant legislation,15 
concerned only with possible criminal purpose, appears to reflect the common law 
position that the mere fact of presence on the land of another is not, in itself, a wrong 
in the eyes of the law.16  
 
Accordingly, on this basis, while it is correct to say that in Scotland there is no "delict 
of trespass",17 it is "loose and inaccurate"18 to say that there is no "law of trespass". 
This legal distinction is sometimes misunderstood, or even denied, as in a work 
urging the opening up of "Britain's countryside" by a "right to roam".19  
 
By tradition Scottish landowners are tolerant of hill walkers (or hikers) and have 
tended to allow a precarious freedom of access to the hills and mountains. This 
position is the basis of a preface statement in Professor Paisley's recent edition of 
the access guide by George Menzies (chairperson of Scotways) that "Scotland has a 
great heritage of access to the countryside".20 The rich history of hill walking and the 
associated "Munro bagging" would never have come to pass without landowners 
being tolerant of responsible access by the public.21 A mid-nineteenth century obiter 
                                                 
13  Reid Law of Property para 183. 
14  Reid Law of Property para 184: "A bare trespass on land...does not always justify the use of 
force". 
15  Wildlife and Natural Environment (Scotland) Act 2011 (which will supersede the Night Poaching 
Acts 1828 and 1844, Trespass (Scotland) Act 1865 and Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 
1944) 
16  The predominant feature of the pre-existing position is a "lack of clarity": see Guthrie "Access 
Rights" 127. 
17  Or "tort of trespass" in the terminology of English law. 
18  Paisley Access Rights 40 quoting Lord Trayner in Wood v North British Railway 1899 2F 1, 2. 
19  Shoard Right to Roam 13: "There is a mysteriously widespread belief that Scotland has no law of 
trespass or that Scottish trespass law is in some way fundamentally different from English law. It 
is not". On the following page (14) the author says that "[d]amages for trespass where no actual 
loss has been incurred are not however available even in theory in Scotland". This later 
statement reflects the very point which represents a significant legal difference. 
20  Paisley Access Rights 5. See also relevant comments in Carey Miller and Combe 2006 
www.ejcl.org 22. 
21  One need only peruse the annals of the Cairngorm Club, established in Aberdeen in 1887,  to 
appreciate the longstanding popularity of Scottish hillwalking and mountaineering; see the 
Cairngorm Club Journal first published 1896, most recently 2007 (vol 21, no 108); see, generally 
Cairngorm Club [Date unknown] www.cairngormclub.org.uk. 
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dictum of Lord Deas22 describes the situation of a technically precarious position that 
was, in practice, essentially secure.  
 
In regard to going to the top of the hill and down again, it would have been an 
unreasonable thing to stop people going in the then state of matters. I have 
been familiar with hills myself, on which I would have thought it a most 
invidious thing if I had been prevented from going to the top and down again, 
and I never knew of anybody being so prevented. But that did not give a right, 
and could not be pretended to have been done in the exercise of a right. 
 
A general right of public access to all land was on the agenda of the Scottish Labour 
administration when parliament – in devolved form – returned to Edinburgh. Early in 
the new Parliament a Land Reform Bill was published; its provisions included a right 
of access package.  
 
A National Access Forum, established by Scottish National Heritage in 1994, had 
brought together the main national interest groups to consider access issues at a 
national level. The Forum's work led to advice to the Scottish Government 
concluding that the prevailing uncertainty was unsatisfactory for both landowner and 
access seeker,23 a position supported by academic advocates of reform.24 As John 
Lovett25 observes "no one was particularly happy with the status quo in Scotland". 
An accurate view of the pre-reform status quo should not deny that general social 
practice in Scotland allowed substantial access to the countryside for recreational 
purposes – if not the definite general right of the reformed law. The reforms have 
substituted a new unitary controlling responsible right structure for the previous 
position in which the strict legal position was in favour of the landowner but, in 
practice, access to hills and mountains was widely available and participated in by 
large numbers of walkers and climbers.  
 
  
                                                 
22  Jenkins v Murray 1866 4M 1046, 1054. 
23  Scottish National Heritage Access to the Countryside; on the history of the development, see 
National Access Forum [Date unknown] www.outdooraccess-scotland.com. 
24  See Rowan-Robertson and Ross 1998 Edin L R 225. 
25  Lovett 2010 Neb L Rev 766. 
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3 The essential features of the reform 
 
The Act provides, first, a right of access to all land and inland waterways for 
recreational or educational purposes and for any commercial purposes involving an 
activity that is not inherently profit driven26 (e.g. access by a paid walking tour guide) 
and, secondly, the "right to cross land".27 The scope of the two distinct spheres of the 
right – respectively, access for recreational, educational or certain commercial 
purposes, and for crossing (i.e. passage) – are clarified by the provisions of the 
legislation. The recreational, educational or potentially commercial aspect is stated to 
refer to "going into, passing over and remaining on it [i.e. the land] for any of those 
purposes and then leaving it, or any combination of those".28 The crossing aspect 
refers to "going into it, passing over it and leaving it all for the purpose of getting from 
one place outside the land to another such place".29  
 
Importantly, the right in both its aspects is subject to a general exclusion and a 
limited category of particular exclusions. The general one of responsible exercise is 
integral to the definition of the scope of the right in that it applies in every instance of 
the right's availability. This important limitation of the right and its correlative – the 
landowner's obligation – will be considered before looking at the (obviously different 
in kind) specific "context of application" limits. By reason of its generality the 
responsible conduct limit is the most significant qualification of the right. But certain 
specific conduct limits are also relevant to the quite complex definition of the right. 
These will be noted in the following section after comment on the generic 
responsible conduct qualification. The exclusion of certain categories of land is 
another aspect of the scope of the right but, being distinct from the limits concerned 
with conduct, this issue will be dealt with in a separate section. 
 
An important feature of the legislation is a significant local authority function in 
respect of the facilitation and upholding of access rights. This is provided for in 
Chapter 5 of the Act.30 Certain particular provisions from that part will be mentioned 
                                                 
26  Sections 1(2)(a) and 1(3)(a), (b) and (c) Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
27  Section 1(2)(b) Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
28  Section 1(4)(a)(i) and (ii) Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
29  Section 1(4)(b) Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
30  Sections 13-27 Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
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in the context of the present treatment but it is beyond the scope of this paper to 
consider the local authority function aspect in any comprehensive way.  
 
3.1 The prerequisite condition of responsible exercise 
   
In providing that "[a] person has access rights only if they are exercised 
responsibly"31 the wording of the Act gives the condition prerequisite status. This is 
clearly important with regard to the extent to which the legislation is an inroad into 
the right of ownership because, provided a landowner co-operates with the spirit and 
system of the Act in terms of the reciprocal obligation, it will be open to him or her to 
deny access on the basis that it is not being exercised responsibly. But the onus is 
on the landowner to show that the exercise is not responsible. This is apparent in the 
wording of the Act, that "[i]n determining whether access rights are exercised 
responsibly" the exercise is presumed to be responsible if it does not "cause 
unreasonable interference with any of the rights (whether access rights, rights 
associated with the ownership of land or any others) of any other person".32  
 
The significance of the "responsible exercise" qualification of the right was 
recognised in the only Court of Session decision thus far on the statutory right of 
access.33 This decision of an Extra Division of the Inner House (Lords Eassie, Hardie 
and Mackay of Drumadoon) was an appeal from the Dingwall Sheriff Court.34 The 
focus of the matter was the issue of a landowner's reciprocal obligation to use and 
manage the land concerned in a responsible manner but, of course, the court 
needed to clarify the position of the legislative context which defines the right of 
access itself. The opinion of the Court, delivered by Lord Eassie, sets out the 
provisions of section 2 providing for responsible exercise, section 3 regarding a 
landowner's reciprocal obligations and section 14 prohibiting deterrent signs or 
obstructions as the relevant legislative framework. This important comment follows: 
 
                                                 
31  Section 2(1) Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
32 Section 2(2) Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
33  Graham and Margo Tuley v Highland Council 2009 SLT 616. For an analysis of the decision see 
Combe  2010 Edin L R 106, 107-109. 
34  Highland Council v Graham and Margo Tuley 2007 SLT (Sh Ct) 77. 
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It is evident from these provisions – and appeared to be recognised by counsel on 
both sides – that the notion of acting "responsibly" plays an important part in the 
scheme of the legislation. Thus a person taking access to land has no right 
of access if he is not acting "responsibly" (section 2(1)). An attempt to add some 
precision to the broad concept of "responsible exercise" is to be found in section 
2(3). The access-taker is also presumed, subject to certain qualifications, to be 
exercising access rights responsibly if those rights are exercised so as not to cause 
unreasonable interference with the rights of any other person (section 2(2)).35  
 
This authoritative interpretation of the core "responsible exercise" criterion is 
significant in confirming that having access rights "only if they are exercised 
responsibly" means that the right is denied to a taker not acting responsibly. 
Presenting the proposition in the negative is an acknowledgement of the inherent 
position of a circumscribed right.  
 
The issue as to whether or not access rights are disallowed because of 
unreasonable interference with another's existing rights is potentially controversial 
but, as indicated, the Act clarifies matters to the extent of the specific exclusion of 
access rights in a mixed category of situations. In these particular circumstances the 
issue of responsible exercise does not arise because access is disallowed. Section 9 
lists the situations under the heading "[c]onduct excluded from access rights" as: (a) 
where presence is in breach of an interdict or other judicial order; (b) where 
presence is for a criminal purpose or a purpose in breach of an interdict or other 
judicial order; (c) for hunting, shooting or fishing; (d) while responsible for a dog or 
other animal not under proper control;36 (e) where presence is for the removal, for 
commercial purposes or profit, of anything in or on the land; (f) using a motorised 
vehicle or vessel other than one for and used by a disabled person; (g) being on a 
golf course for the recreational, educational or a permitted commercial purpose 
provided for (but, significantly, without implications for the right to cross a golf 
course).37  
 
                                                 
35  Graham and Margo Tuley v Highland Council 2009 SLT 616 para 17. 
36  On this see Reid and Gretton Conveyancing 138-139. 
37  Reading ss 6(1)(e), 7(b) and 9(g) together, it would appear that the access right over a golf 
course is limited to crossing, provided this does not involve traversing a green. The Code para 2.2 of 
the Access Code (see below section 5) refers to golf as open to access "but only for crossing them and 
providing that you do not take access across greens or interfere with any games of golf". Rather 
surprisingly the Code (in the Part 5 Practical Guide) envisages the possibility of cyclists and horse 
riders on golf courses but they "need to keep to paths at all times and not go on to any other part of 
the course". 
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What is the position of a landowner who considers that the access right is not being 
exercised in a responsible way? In the event of the statutory access right being 
disallowed through irresponsible exercise38 the affected landowner's common law 
rights apply. In principle, in this situation, the use of reasonable means to obtain the 
removal of the person or persons concerned should be open to the landowner. This 
interpretation seems to be supported by a definitional provision that "[t]he exercise of 
access rights does not of itself constitute trespass".39 There being no access right if 
exercise is not responsible, it follows that access of this sort does constitute trespass 
open to the remedy of removal.  
 
A recent dictum of Sheriff Holligan recognises the significance of the "responsible 
exercise" qualification in terms of the availability of the access right. Elaborating on 
the comment that "it is important to note that a person only has such rights if they are 
'exercised responsibly'" the learned Sheriff went on to comment: 
 
Accordingly, in my opinion, by prescribing that a person has access rights only if 
exercised responsibly, it follows that should a person purport to exercise the rights 
in a way which is irresponsible, such a person is no longer exercising access rights 
conferred by the 2003 Act and is therefore no longer entitled to such protection as 
the 2003 Act confers upon someone who does exercise the rights responsibly.40 
  
It is submitted that this dictum is consistent with the Court of Session one in Tuley 
quoted above.41  
 
A possible example of irresponsible behaviour would be an access taker's refusing to 
take an alternative route when requested to do so because crop spraying is affecting 
the safety of using the preferred route.42 Proceeding in these circumstances would 
not be responsible and the right would be disallowed with the consequence that the 
landowner's common law right to require and, if necessary, enforce removal would 
be restored.  
 
                                                 
38  Section 2(1) Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
39  Section 5(1) Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
40  Forbes v The Fife Council 2009 SLT (Sh Ct) 71 para 23. 
41  Graham and Margo Tuley v Highland Council 2009 SLT 616 para 17. 
42  See Access Code 5.1, discussed below in section 5: "Fields where crops are being sprayed or 
fertilised". 
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3.2 A landowner's reciprocal obligation  
 
As indicated, the Act introduced a regime in which the primary right is a prescribed 
entitlement to responsibly exercised access to another's land. The right necessarily 
involves a correlative obligation to accede to responsibly exercised access within the 
prescribed limits, but the Act goes further in a section providing for the "reciprocal 
obligations of owners".43 This section imposes a duty on "every owner of land in 
respect of which access rights are exercisable – (a) to use and manage the land; 
and (b) otherwise to conduct the ownership of it, in a way which, as respects those 
rights, is responsible".44 The section's reference to "responsible" is stated to refer to 
what "is lawful and reasonable and takes proper account of the interests of persons 
exercising or seeking to exercise access rights".45  
 
A landowner's exercise of inherent rights is deemed to be responsible "if it does not 
cause unreasonable interference with the access rights of any person exercising or 
seeking to exercise" his or her rights under the Act. However, two matters are 
specified as relevant to recognition of the presumption. Firstly, conduct in 
contravention of the prohibition of signs, obstructions and dangerous impediments 
under section 14 is to be taken as not meeting the responsible conduct criterion;46 
secondly, regard should be had to anything done by the landowner in disregard of 
the guidance on responsible conduct in the Access Code.47  
 
The Court of Session decision Tuley v Highland Council48 already referred to is 
relevant to the reciprocal obligation of an owner. The issue in this case was not a 
question of a landowner's privacy but rather one of power and control over decisions 
concerning the provision of recreational access. Essentially, the issue was whether 
or not the landowners could 'manage' the situation by erecting a barrier to prevent 
                                                 
43  Section 3 Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
44  Section 3(1) Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
45  Section 3(3) Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
46  Section 3(2)(a) Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
47  Section 3(2)(b) Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. Part 5 of the Access Code provides "a 
practical guide to access rights and responsibilities" listing 48 situations or activities concerning 
responsible behaviour by the public and land managers. The Code (5.1) states that the coverage 
is not complete "but it should help to indicate what is or is not responsible behaviour". The legal 
status of the code is discussed below. 
48  Graham and Margo Tuley v Highland Council 2009 SLT 616. 
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equestrian use of a path as a protection against erosion which might make it 
unsuitable for walkers. It was argued that even though damage was likely to occur, 
horse riders had rights of access which they were entitled to exercise over suitable 
tracks and, on this basis, it was premature and irresponsible to close routes in 
anticipation of possible damage. The court rejected this position and found, rather, 
that the Tuleys had embarked on "a responsible exercise of land management" and 
that they were seeking to make the different access activities "compatible inter se" in 
a manner consistent with and "in furtherance of their principal duty in section 3(1) of 
the Act".49  
 
An important part of the decision in Tuley is its recognition of a link between a 
landowner's purpose in doing something in the legitimate use or development of the 
land and the "scheme of the Act"50 factor of responsible exercise. Noting the 
subjective nature of the notion of "purpose" the Court first observes that 
 
the scheme of the Act, and its reliance on the very protean concepts of acting 
"responsibly" if anything endorses that subjective approach, which ultimately may 
focus on the bona fides of the landowner.51  
 
The opinion goes on to note that  
 
in the context of section 14(1) of the Act, it envisages many agricultural activities 
which may have the foreseeable result of preventing responsible access but which 
is done for the wider purpose of the agricultural management of the land. 52  
 
This linking is of obvious importance in its recognition that the landowner's legitimate 
use of the land concerned will be relevant to the decision whether or not an access 
taker's conduct is a "responsible exercise". 
 
The crop spraying example given in the previous section53 is an illustration of an 
"agricultural or other operation on the land" providing a legitimate basis for the 
suspension of access because it would clearly not be an operation carried out "for 
                                                 
49  Graham and Margo Tuley v Highland Council 2009 SLT 616 para 35. 
50  Graham and Margo Tuley v Highland Council 2009 SLT 616 para 41. 
51  Graham and Margo Tuley v Highland Council 2009 SLT 616 para 41. 
52  Graham and Margo Tuley v Highland Council 2009 SLT 616 para 41. 
53   See above n 42: 
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the purpose or for the main purpose of preventing or deterring" otherwise legitimate 
access.54  
 
4 Excluded land 
 
The enacted provision excludes land on general and particular bases. The limited 
scope of general exclusions focuses on protecting working installation interests and 
domestic home privacy while the specific exclusions are reflected in a listing of 
particular categories of land in respect of which the provision of access would be 
inappropriate. The general limits are more important because they go to defining the 
right's core character and, of course, the extent to which it diminishes the right of 
ownership. In the structure of the Act, section 6 lists the categories of land excluded 
by reason of existing use or designation and section 7 supplements and qualifies the 
list. The end result is complex and only an overview can be given here.  
 
This 'type of land' limitation is distinguishable from a denial of access on the basis of 
conduct already discussed. Malcolm Combe55 noted this important difference in an 
instructive comment: 
 
… there are two types of case in which a purported access taker may not be 
entitled to take access: first, with reference to the land in question (a 'where' case), 
and secondly, with reference to that individual's conduct (a 'how' case)." 
 
This section will focus on the domestic home privacy exclusion which, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, has been central in some contentious litigation. But, first, the 
exclusions on various particular bases will be briefly mentioned. 
 
The Act excludes from the right of public access land associated with some form of 
works installation "to the extent that there is on it...a building, or other structure56 or 
works, plant or fixed machinery"57 and the land forms, either, the "curtilage58 of a 
                                                 
54  Section 14(1)(d) Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
55  Combe 2008 Edin L R 463, 464. 
56  Section 6(2) Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 provides that for the purposes of this provision "a 
bridge, tunnel, causeway, launching site, groyne, weir, boulder weir, embankment of a canalised 
waterway, fence, wall or anything designed to facilitate passage is not to be regarded as a 
structure". 
57  Section 6(1)(a)(i) Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
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building which is not a house or of a group of buildings none of which is a house"59 
or "forms a compound or other enclosure containing any such structure, works plant 
or fixed machinery".60  
 
School land is also excluded by association with a building (obviously, in this case, a 
school building) insofar as it "consists of land contiguous to and used for the 
purposes of a school".61  
 
The legislation excludes land used for various purposes seen to be incompatible with 
a right of public access. The following are excluded:  
 
Sports and playing fields in use (but golf greens, bowling greens, cricket squares and 
lawn tennis courts are excluded absolutely) and land developed for recreational 
purposes if access would interfere with the recreational use; fields of sown or 
growing crops; building, engineering, demolition, mining, quarry and statutory 
undertaking sites (e.g. Scottish Water); airport and railway land; land in respect of 
which access is curtailed under any other enactment to the extent of the limitation; 
shared private residents' gardens (as in Edinburgh New Town) and land in respect of 
which an entry fee was payable prior to 31 January 2001 and continues to be 
payable on at least 90 days in the year.62  
 
4.1 Privacy – the flashpoint 
 
A significant issue for the draftsman of a general public right of access to private land 
was of course the privacy of persons residing on the land. This had necessarily to be 
a primary consideration concerning the extent of the inroad into the right of 
ownership. Any general right of access to private land – regardless of qualifications 
                                                                                                                                                        
58  I.e. the particular associated area. 
59  Section 6(1)(b)(i) Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
60  Section 6(1)(b)(ii) Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
61  Section 6(1)(b)(iii) Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. A school is defined in s 7(4) as not only one 
within the meaning of s 135(1) of the Education (Scotland) Act 1980 but also "any other 
institution which provides education for children below school age within the meaning of that 
provision". 
62  For details of the particular exclusions see the provisions of ss 6 and 7 Land Reform (Scotland) 
Act 2003. 
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as to purpose – without sufficient specific protection of domestic privacy would have 
been unacceptable. 
 
The domestic privacy exclusion applicable to land on which there is a house or "a 
caravan, tent or other place affording a person privacy or shelter"63 requires 
"sufficient adjacent land to enable persons living there to have reasonable measures 
of privacy in that house or place to ensure that their enjoyment of that house or place 
is not unreasonably disturbed".64  
 
Some clarification of the intended meaning of this provision is provided in the 
supplementary provision requiring that "the location and other characteristics of the 
house or other place" be included "among the factors which go to determine what 
extent of land is sufficient for the purposes mentioned in s 6(1)(b)(iv)".65 
  
The first decision on the critical issue of the scope of the right of access in terms of a 
tension with the privacy of a landowner's domestic sphere was in Gloag v Perth & 
Kinross Council and the Ramblers' Association.66 This matter, decided by Sheriff 
Michael J Fletcher, was concerned with Kinfauns Castle near Perth, the residence of 
bus and coach tycoon Ann Gloag. In issue was access to 4.45 hectares of land, the 
enclosed grounds of a mansion house with a floor area of some 4,800 square metres 
– almost 0.5 of a hectare.  
 
An important part of Sheriff Fletcher's opinion dealt with the interpretation of the 
exclusion of access on the basis of privacy. In response to a submission on behalf of 
the Ramblers Association that the issue was whether exclusion of the public to the 
limit of the fence was necessary for the enjoyment of the house, the learned Sheriff 
pointed out that the wording did not support a construction involving "necessity to 
show that exclusion is required".67 Rather, "the landowner is entitled to sufficient land 
to be excluded to ensure (my emphasis)68 that their enjoyment of the house is not 
                                                 
63  Section 6(1)(a)(ii) Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
64  Section 6(1)(b)(iv) Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
65  Section 7(5) Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
66  Gloag v Perth & Kinross Council and the Ramblers' Association 2007 SCLR 530. 
67  Gloag v Perth & Kinross Council and the Ramblers' Association 2007 SCLR 530 para 42. 
68  i.e. Sheriff's emphasis. 
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unreasonably disturbed".69 The legislation in fact says "that house or place" and so 
envisages possible differentiation depending upon the type of property involved. But 
nothing other than a variable measure dependent upon the circumstances could be 
apposite to the determination of the meaning of "reasonable measures of privacy in 
that house or place" sufficient "to ensure that their enjoyment of that house or place 
is not unreasonably disturbed".70 In the scheme of the Act, land within the zone of 
the privacy exclusion is land over which access rights are not exercisable. This is 
made clear in section 1 establishing the right – "land in respect of which access 
rights are exercisable is all land except that specified in or under section 6 below".71 
It is submitted that this construction means that a landowner can assert a certain 
sphere of domestic privacy and deny entry into that sphere to persons seeking 
access who, in turn, may challenge the position on the basis that it does not meet 
the relevant privacy criterion. It should also be noted that certain distinguished 
academic commentators appear not to subscribe to the interpretation of a sphere of 
privacy depending on the nature and circumstances of the property. John Lovett 
says that "[t]he LRSA does not grant large landowners an entitlement to greater 
amounts of privacy and personal autonomy than owners of more modest estates".72  
While any introduction of a notion of "genuine access taker" 73 not provided for in the 
legislation seems unworkable,74 a compelling point in the discussion part of Sheriff 
Fletcher's opinion is the observation that the specific exclusion of shared private 
gardens75 seems consistent with legislative policy to exclude “garden areas round 
private houses".76  
 
Applying an objective "reasonableness" test to determine the area of ground 
sufficient for the privacy of residents77 the court considered it "certain...that a 
reasonably substantial area of ground standing the nature of the property is excluded 
                                                 
69  Gloag v Perth & Kinross Council and the Ramblers' Association 2007 SCLR 530 para 42. 
70  Section 6(1)(b)(iv) Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
71   Section 1(7) Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
72  Lovett 2010 Neb L Rev 796. See also Reid and Gretton Conveyancing 131-132, where the 
learned authors comment on the issue of "large gardens for large houses in Gloag”. 
73  Arising from the expert evidence of an access officer in Gloag (para 18) but not taken forward in 
the Sheriff's decision.  
74  See Combe 2008 Edin L R 467; Lovett 2010 Neb L Rev 794. 
75  Section 6(1)(c) Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
76  Gloag v Perth & Kinross Council and the Ramblers' Association 2007 SCLR 530 para 49. 
77  Gloag v Perth & Kinross Council and the Ramblers' Association 2007 SCLR 530 para 52. 
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from access rights by the terms of section 6".78 On this basis it was decided that, 
while enjoyment of the house depended upon a number of factors, "it could not be 
ensured by a smaller area [than the circa 4.5 hectares79] of adjacent ground...taking 
into account the location and characteristics of the house".80 
 
Shortly after the Gloag decision, Snowie v Stirling Council and the Ramblers' 
Association81 was decided by Sheriff A M Cubie. This case involved Boquhan House 
and other dwellings, all part of a 28 hectare property near Stirling. The court rejected 
a submission that the privacy factor was properly determined by reference to "the 
standards of the persons affected in the house i.e. that the test was "person specific" 
and "location specific". 82 Agreeing with the approach in Gloag, the court applied an 
objective test in deciding that while the entire property was not excluded "a 
reasonably substantial area of ground" needed to be excluded to "ensure that 
enjoyment of the house was not unreasonably disturbed".83 The court made the 
important point that the purpose of excluding certain ground was "not to secure the 
enjoyment of the 'policies' for the occupants of the house, but to secure the 
enjoyment of the house itself".84 The end result was an order excluding an area of 
about 5 hectares around the mansion house. This outcome is broadly consistent with 
that in Gloag but the results are distinguishable in that the Snowies were seeking an 
exclusion extending to their entire 28 hectare estate. 
  
An aspect of Snowie distinguishing it from Gloag was the existence of a common law 
right of way. While statutory access rights are not affected by the existence of a 
transversing right of way,85 arguably Sheriff Cubie was correct in expecting to be 
informed as to the right of way.86 A right of way could have implications for the 
privacy issue in identifying a prevailing access position, unchallengeable by the 
landowner. But in principle the existence of a right of way route should not come into 
                                                 
78  Gloag v Perth & Kinross Council and the Ramblers' Association 2007 SCLR 530 para 59. 
79  Author's note. 
80  Gloag v Perth & Kinross Council and the Ramblers' Association 2007 SCLR 530 para 60. 
81  Snowie v Stirling Council and the Ramblers' Association 2008 SLT (Sh Ct) 61. 
82  Snowie v Stirling Council and the Ramblers' Association 2008 SLT (Sh Ct) 61 para 51. 
83  Snowie v Stirling Council and the Ramblers' Association 2008 SLT (Sh Ct) 61 para 56.It may be 
noted that Sheriff Cubie in para 48 adopts "verbatim the analysis of the law contained in Sheriff 
Fletcher's judgement in Gloag" [paras 24-31]. 
84  Snowie v Stirling Council and the Ramblers' Association 2008 SLT (Sh Ct) 61 para 56. 
85  Combe  2008 Edin L R 466-467. 
86  Snowie v Stirling Council and the Ramblers' Association 2008 SLT (Sh Ct) 61 para 36. 
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the reckoning in a question of whether or not the landowner's right under section 
6(1)(b)(iv) defeated a claim to access in fact more intrusive of privacy than that 
produced by the right of way. 
 
Ross v Stirling Council87 was a companion decision to Snowie. Professor and Dr 
Ross owned and resided in the West Lodge, a detached house with garden ground 
within the Boquhan Estate. While the two cases were as one in terms of common 
opposition to access over the estate they were different in their respective claims to 
section 6(1)(b)(iv). Sheriff Cubie recognised this. 
 
Again, I agree with Sheriff Fletcher in that anyone contemplating the purchase of a 
house such as Kinfauns Castle or Boquhan House would not consider doing so if 
the house itself and its grounds (and by that I mean a material area around the 
house) were not able to be used by them privately. The West Lodge, while in a very 
scenic location is not in the same category of property, and accordingly will give rise 
to different considerations about what constitutes sufficient ground.88  
 
Creelman v Argyll and Bute Council 2009,89 decided by Sheriff Derek Livingston, 
involved a 2.4 hectare property on which two houses stand, the five bedroomed 
Stronardron House and the smaller Dunans Lodge. About one third of the total 
property area is precipitous and inaccessible. Mr and Mrs Creelman, who lived in the 
bigger house and let out the smaller one, demonstrated their commitment to the 
long-term project of developing the entire accessible property as a garden. The 
public access issue was initiated by neighbouring landowner, Mr Dickson Spain, who 
wanted, as part of a commercial venture, to bring visitors to his Dunans Castle via 
pedestrian access through the Creelmans' land made possible only by the 
Creelmans' work. The local authority, supporting the idea, took the matter up under 
section 14 of the Act – allowing a local authority to challenge action by a landowner 
denying access – when the Creelmans put up a "no access" sign. Taking into 
account a wide range of particular considerations, the court found that only a total 
exclusion of access rights would allow "reasonable privacy within what might be said 
to be their reasonable garden area".90 In arriving at this conclusion the court paid 
attention to section 7(5) pointing to "the location and other characteristics of the 
                                                 
87  Lindsay and Barbara Ross v Stirling Council 2008 SLT (Sh Ct) 61. 
88  Lindsay and Barbara Ross v Stirling Council 2008 SLT (Sh Ct) 61 para 56. 
89  Creelman v Argyll and Bute Council 2009 SLT (Sh Ct) 165. 
90  Creelman v Argyll and Bute Council 2009 SLT (Sh Ct) 165 para 66. 
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house" as factors relevant to "what extent of land is sufficient" for the purposes of a 
determination on the privacy exclusion under section 6(1)(b)(iv). Relevant in this 
regard was evidence "that the land here was small for a house the size of 
Stronardron in that type of locality".91  
 
The decision in Forbes v Fife Council92 is distinguishable from the privacy exclusion 
issue cases of Gloag, Snowie and Creelman concerned with the position of large 
rural houses and the delineation of a sufficient private sphere. The matter, however, 
does have a certain similarity to Ross in that both involved the issue of possible 
exclusion of access beyond their boundaries on the basis of the privacy associated 
with a dwelling house.  
 
In Forbes the issue was not access to garden ground but to an adjacent path, held 
by the pursuers in common with six neighbouring landowners. The fundamental 
question was if the use of the path by the public was precluded on the basis of the 
section 6(1)(b)(iv). Findings of fact that the pursuers' house was situated away from 
a six-foot fence which separated their reasonably sized garden from the path made it 
difficult to make a case for a sphere of privacy extending beyond their garden 
ground. Giving the pursuers' case every consideration the court took the view that 
"what is happening on the land is a factor to which regard may be had, along with all 
the other factors, before reaching a decision as to what is sufficient adjacent land".93 
Accordingly, in the example of a house in the middle of a field, evidence that access 
is regularly taken by passing very close to the house "may be relevant in helping to 
set the bounds of what is sufficient adjacent land".94 The introduction of this potential 
variable95 does not fit an otherwise objective assessment of circumstances. Those 
who venture closer than an objectively determined limit do not have an access right 
and are vulnerable to the landowner's common law rights.  
 
  
                                                 
91  Creelman v Argyll and Bute Council 2009 SLT (Sh Ct) 165 para 67. 
92  Forbes v The Fife Council 2009 SLT (Sh Ct) 71. 
93  Forbes v The Fife Council 2009 SLT (Sh Ct) 71 para 28. 
94  Forbes v The Fife Council 2009 SLT (Sh Ct) 804 para 28. 
95  Lovett 2010 Neb L Rev 71. 
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5 Scottish Outdoor Access Code 
 
A part of the access rights package under Part 1 of the Act is the provision in 
Chapter 3 for a code to be produced by Scottish Natural Heritage. The Act provides, 
first, that the Code should set out – in relation to access rights – guidance as to the 
circumstances in which "those exercising these rights are to be regarded as doing so 
in a way which is or is not responsible".96  
 
Section 10 goes on to provide that the Code should also give guidance, on conduct 
by third parties – i.e. neither access-takers nor landowners – likely to affect the 
exercise of access rights; the use, management or other conduct by landowners in a 
way which is or is not responsible; and the use, management or other conduct by 
landowners in respect of which rights are not exercisable but are likely to affect the 
exercise of those rights on contiguous land.97  
 
Published in 2005 the Code contains much useful detail but its "user friendly" 
composition does not always lend itself to interpretation of the Act. For example, the 
Act in section 2(1) says that "a person has access rights only if they are exercised 
responsibly"; the relevant part of the Code starts with the statement "[y]ou must 
exercise access rights responsibly", which is less strong than the formulation of the 
Act in that it fails to present the plain position that the right is only one of responsible 
exercise.  
 
Sheriff Fletcher in the Gloag case did not find the Code of assistance: "looking at the 
terms of the Code it is clear that it is prepared as a practical guide…rather than an 
aid to interpretation". 98 Regarding the interpretation of section 6, on the important 
issue of the privacy of the resident of a dwelling, he took the view that "it cannot be 
said that the advice and guidance given by the Code is a direct help to the 
interpretation of section 6".99  
 
                                                 
96  Section 10(1)(a) Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
97  Section 10(1)(b), (c) and (d) Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
98  Gloag v Perth & Kinross Council and the Ramblers' Association 2007 SCLR 530 para 35. 
99  Gloag v Perth & Kinross Council and the Ramblers' Association 2007 SCLR 530 para 36. 
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But while the Code probably has limited utility as an aid to the interpretation of the 
statutory provisions, it may be of use in terms of guidance on particular issues. 
Sheriff Fletcher in the Gloag case, dealing with the point that access rights "are 
available only if they are exercised responsibly", observed that a party engaging in 
conduct specifically excluded by section 9 "would not be exercising access rights 
responsibly" and went on to note that "[s]imilarly disregarding the guidance on 
responsible conduct set out in the Access Code incumbent upon persons exercising 
access rights would not be exercising access rights responsibly".100 This reflects the 
wording of section 2(2)(b) of the Act. The Code therefore has a potentially significant 
role to play in the comprehensive range of particular matters of "responsible 
behaviour" by the public and by land managers provided for in Part 5.  
 
6 The European Convention on Human Rights  
 
Both the general protection of the right of property under Protocol 1, Article 1 and the 
particular protection of a person's rights in respect of private and family life and the 
home under Article 8 are potentially relevant to the question of whether or not the 
radical Scottish provision for public access to private land complies with the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
      
Protocol 1 Art.1 provides: 
 
(1) Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public 
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general 
principles of international law.  
(2) The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a 
state to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in 
accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other 
contributions or penalties. 
 
The obvious latitude, especially in respect of land, for limitations in the public or 
general interest is confirmed in the relevant jurisprudence.101 The recognition of a 
tension in the terms of the grundnorm provision itself has, of course, led to a 
                                                 
100  Gloag v Perth & Kinross Council and the Ramblers' Association 2007 SCLR 530 para 25; this 
dictum is part of Sheriff Fletcher's opinion adopted by Sheriff Cubie in Snowie v Stirling Council 
and the Ramblers' Association 2008 SLT (Sh Ct) 61 para 48 (see above n 83). 
101  See, for example, James v UK 1986 8 EHRR 116. 
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jurisprudence emphasising the necessity of a balancing-of-interests approach 
without obvious challenge to the position of states to control landownership in 
accordance with national priorities. In terms of the substance of norms controlling the 
constituent rights which make up land ownership, one might say that the lex situs 
notion prevails. Consistent with this thinking, and importantly in the present context, 
the case law has come to recognise that the detail of a controlling requirement of 
balancing is appropriately dealt with in the statute. The Scottish access legislation 
does this and, to this extent, is probably proof against constitutional challenge. It is 
submitted that the comments of Professor André van der Walt relating to the English 
access provision apply equally to the Scottish legislation. 
 
The 2000 English Act102 defines public access to access land fairly widely but 
imposes strict limits on it. Because the Act explicitly establishes a fair balance 
between public access rights and the private rights of the landowners it could 
effectively and successfully deprive landowners, without providing for compensation, 
of their right to sue in trespass anyone who enters the land without their 
permission.103  
 
Of course, at the domestic level the implications of the required legislative balancing 
process must be considered and given effect to in the circumstances of particular 
cases. On this basis it is apparent that only relatively general precedents can be 
established in respect of the critical privacy issue under section 6.  
 
The question of compliance with the fairly specific mandate of Article 8 necessarily 
involves matters more particular than general deprivation which, at the level of 
interpretation in a specific context, must of course be open to variation according to 
circumstances. The relevant article provides that: 
 
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being 
                                                 
102  Referring to the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000; see below, part 7. 
103  Van der Walt Property in the Margins 194-195. 
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of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
In the Gloag case104 counsel for the pursuer argued that even though it was 
accepted that the access provisions of the Act complied with the ECHR, Article 8 
remained relevant to the decision in terms of section 6 (1)(b)(iv) of the Act as to the 
extent of the land around the residence over which access rights should not be 
exercised. The point here was that Article 8 in effect mandated an interpretation of 
section 6 which took account of the personal circumstances of residents of the 
dwelling.105  
 
It is submitted that the role of Article 8 is not denied in Sheriff Fletcher's observations 
as to the interplay between the grundnorm principle and the legislative provision: 
 
[O]nce it is accepted that the Act is not incompatible with Convention rights and 
assuming that the court makes a decision which was correct in relation to 
sufficiency [of the land excluded around a dwelling] there would be no 
contravention…on the other hand if the court were wrong about sufficiency that 
decision can be put right without reference to the Convention because it would be a 
contravention of the 2003 Act.106  
 
7 The English law approach 
 
This brief overview is for the sole purpose of contrasting the general features of the 
English reforms, which preceded the Scottish ones by only a few years. 
 
In English common law the act of trespass itself is actionable on the basis of the tort 
of trespass to land.107 The landowner's right to exclude a person present on his or 
her land without permission is backed up not only by a power to exclude, as in 
Scotland, but also by the availability of a civil action to recover damages in respect of 
the act of trespass. 
 
                                                 
104  Gloag v Perth & Kinross Council and the Ramblers' Association 2007 SCLR 530. 
105  Gloag v Perth & Kinross Council and the Ramblers' Association 2007 SCLR 530 para 61. 
106  Gloag v Perth & Kinross Council and the Ramblers' Association 2007 SCLR 530 para 65. 
107  See Halsbury et al Halsbury's Law of England Vol 45(2) para 505: "Every unlawful entry by one 
person on land in the possession of another is a trespass for which a claim may be brought, even 
though no actual damage is done". 
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Selective limitation of a landowner's right against recreational access takers has 
occurred in modern times in response to a not insignificant public call for "a right to 
roam". The culmination of this trend came in the legislation identified in the leading 
general text on English land law as "[a] statutory 'right to roam'"108. The reforms 
provide a general right of pedestrian access to "open country".109 Only certain land is 
subject to the statutory "right to roam".110  
 
Gray and Gray111 contrast the more extensive Scottish right: 
 
The Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, although revolutionary in its way, still 
suffers from limitations which are exposed by comparison with the extensive access 
provision made by the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. Under this 
enactment…every citizen has a presumptive entitlement, not to defined "access 
land" but to all land in Scotland subject only to express exclusions. The statutory 
"access rights" include the right to cross land and to use land for recreational, 
educational and certain commercial purposes. The range of permissible forms of 
access is also much less restrictive than in England, including access by foot, horse 
or cycle, camping, canoeing and air sports. The Scottish legislation may well 
provide a model for adoption or adaption in the next phase of English access 
legislation, not least in the light of its emphasis on the educational aspect of 
recreational access to the outdoors.   
 
8 Remedies 
 
The Act provides for the determination, on summary application to a sheriff court, of 
the central controlling issues of excluded land, responsible exercise by the access 
taker, and responsible management by the landowner.112 There is also provision for 
a determination as to the right to the crossing of land by a path, bridleway or other 
means, and whether on foot, horseback, pedal cycle or any combination of these 
means.113  
 
                                                 
108  Gray and Gray Elements of Land Law PARA 5.46. 
109  Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 s 1(2). 
110  Amounting to some 10% of the total land area of England and Wales made up of: i/ all land over 
600m above sea level (the highest mountain in England being Scafell Pike at 978m and in Wales 
Snowdon at 1085m) together with definitively mapped areas of "open country"; ii/ all registered 
common land – an extension of the "village green" idea provided for by the Commons 
Registration Act 1965 (c.3% England, 9% Wales of total land); iii/ land irrevocably dedicated by 
the owner for public access; see Gray and Gray Elements of Land Law paras 5.40 and 5.47. 
111  Gray and Gray Elements of Land Law para 5.50. 
112  Section 28(1) Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
113  Section 28(2) Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
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As urged above,114 the better view is that the landowner's remedy has not changed 
to the extent that he or she may not apply reasonable means to obtain the removal 
of a party who has no right under the Act. In principle, resort to interdict also remains 
competent. Prior to the legislation the landowner could, in principle, always obtain 
the removal of a party present on a precarious basis. The position has changed to 
the extent that in a wide range of circumstances the access taker is present on the 
basis of a right, but if the right is forfeited because it is not exercised responsibly, it 
must necessarily be that the common law remedies are available to the landowner. 
The party seeking access can, of course, seek a declaration from the sheriff court 
that his or her exercise is in accordance with the legislation. 
 
The Act's provision for the judicial determination of issues does not displace the 
landowner's common law right. As a matter of principle, where the access taker has 
no right, as in the situation identified in the Tuley case,115 the landowner must 
necessarily have the right to exclude the party concerned. From a policy point of 
view certain obvious forms of irresponsible conduct to the potential detriment to the 
landowner's interests justify this residual right.  
 
9 Concluding observations 
 
Would it be accurate to say that, at any rate in broad terms, a technically precarious 
but de facto largely secure position has been recast on a structured correlative 
right/responsibility basis? For hill walkers one could hardly contend that the practical 
position has changed in any major way. On this basis, while the Scottish access to 
land reforms are from one perspective radical they may also be seen as simply 
making the longstanding de facto position of public access to the hills and mountains 
a de jure situation. But, as will be noted shortly, this is only part of the picture.  
 
An aspect of the shift – perhaps insufficiently recognised – is the proximity between 
the former de facto position and the reformed regime, because of the critical factor of 
a right contingent upon responsible exercise. As already stated, the only Court of 
                                                 
114  See 3.1 prerequisite condition of responsible exercise. 
115  Graham and Margo Tuley v Highland Council 2009 SLT 616. For an analysis of the decision see 
Combe  2010 Edin L R 106, 107-109. 
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Session decision relevant to the issue has confirmed that the right is denied if its 
exercise is not responsible.116 Arguably, the movement has been from a precarious 
position to a right revocable on the basis of irresponsible exercise – significantly, a 
qualified legal right.117 The "responsible exercise" factor leaves the landowner in a 
position to assert his property interest albeit no longer on an arbitrary basis but only 
in circumstances in which it is under actual threat. Another relevant difference here is 
that the access taker's thinking now is that in principle he or she has the right to 
proceed.   
   
But this characterisation is an oversimplification in a number of ways. Previously not 
well known in Scotland, "ramblers" have joined the hill walkers; the reforms have 
added a dimension and opened up potential access to land in general including 
much more than the extensive – and largely wilderness – hill and mountain areas of 
Scotland. Of course the "all land" aspect of the reforms multiplies the extent to which 
there may be a "responsible access" issue, because the likelihood of conflict 
between the access taker and the landowner is much greater in the context of 
developed land. 
 
From the comparative law perspective of the conference at which this paper, in its 
initial form, was given, one can only say that the Scottish reforms reflect the trite 
point that the lex situs factor remains predominant in land law. Subscription to the 
ECHR supra-jurisdiction norm has implications for the form of any redistribution of 
rights – more or less as a matter of fair process – but the substance remains 
essentially a matter for domestic law.  
 
The South African Constitution sets out a controlling agenda for land reform with 
major implications for the protection of property in terms of the position of the 
common law. As part of that development the landowner's power to evict has been 
redefined but without recognition of any general notion of public access to private 
property. However, as Professor André van der Walt has shown, post-apartheid case 
                                                 
116  Graham and Margo Tuley v Highland Council 2009 SLT 616.   
117 See Lovett 2010 Neb L Rev 742 contrasting the "right to exclude" regime with a position 
favouring responsible access under the Act: "the [Act]  actually replaces the traditionally robust, 
modular, ex ante presumption in favor of the right to exclude with a surprisingly simple, but also 
robust, ex ante presumption in favor of responsible access…"   
 
 DL CAREY MILLER                                                                 PER / PELJ 2012(15)2 
 
143 / 569 
 
law does reflect certain moves to restrict a landowner's general right to exclude.118 
But a limit on the power to exclude persons, on the basis of their behaviour, from 
private premises open to the public119 is different in kind from a general right of 
public access for recreational and educational purposes.   
                                                 
118  Van der Walt Property in the Margins 195. 
119 Victoria & Albert Waterfront (Pty) Ltd v Police Commissioner, Western Cape 2004 4 SA 444 (C).  
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